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A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Paris Climate Agreement and Bederman's
Six Myths About International Law and
International Legal Practice
MARKUS G. PUDER, PH.D.*

"Let us face it: there is no planet B." Emmanuel Macron**
In his seminal work, International Law Frameworks, the late Professor

David J. Bederman of Emory Law School confronts and debunks several
myths that have persistently clouded international law and international
legal practice. In homage to Professor Bederman's insightful and creative
work, my article harnesses his myths to elucidate recent developments in the
evolving field of international climate law.

I.

Introduction***

The
climate
climate
of life,

international scientific, legal,
barely covers four decades.'
debate has continued to range
or the absence thereof, on a

and political conversation about our
As the spectrum of opinions in the
from cataclysmic doomsday scenarios
hotter planet2 to conspiracy theories

* The Honorable Herbert W. Christenberry Professor of Law, Loyola University New
Orleans College of Law. First Legal State Examination, Ludwig-Maximilians University,
Munich, Germany; Second Legal State Examination, Munich Upper Court of Appeals; LL.M.,
Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D. in Law, Ludwig-Maximilians University. Member
of the New York State Bar and the U.S. Supreme Court Bar.
** July Hirschfield Davis, Macron Critiques Trump's Policies in Speech to Congress, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/us/politics/macron-congress-speechtrump.html.
*** This article develops themes broached in my keynote address at the 23rd International
Petroleum Environmental Conference (IPEC-23) in New Orleans, Louisiana. I would like to
thank John A. Veil of Veil Environmental LL.C. and the organizers of IPEC-23. The views
advanced in this article are strictly mine.
1.John 'W. Zillman, A History of Climate Activities, 58 (3) Bulletin of the World Meterological
Org. [WVMO] 141 (2009) (referring to the First World Climate Conference convened under the
auspices of the World Meteorological Organization in 1979), https://ane4bf-datapl.s3 -eu-west1.amazonaws.com/wmocms/s3 fs-public/article-bulletin/related-docs/5 8-3-zillman-en.pdf InHSQzd.63T9FloxaG7rtlV8pQCUW4F.
2. See generally MARK
Geographic 2008).
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labeling climate change a Chinese hoax, 3 international climate law has
moved quite slowly.4
Lawmaking efforts to protect the global climate did not gain steam until
the 1990s. Prior to the arrival of the Paris Agreement in late 2015,5 they
resulted in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992
(UNFCCC),6 the Kyoto Protocol of 1997,7 and the Copenhagen Accord of
2009.8
The UNFCCC pursues the long-term objective to stabilize "greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."9
Commitments under the UNFCCC, which are generally prefaced by
"shall," differ by degrees of development. 0 In addition to inventorying and
reporting information related to the implementation of the UNFCCC, all
parties shall mitigate climate change by reducing or avoiding greenhouse gas
emissions." But only developed countries shall deploy policies and measures
(PAMs) to abate and mitigate climate change.12 Yet, the PAMs are not linked
up with a legally binding target beyond the aim to return to 1990 levels.3
Finally, a subset of developed countries shall collectively mobilize financial
resources for developing countries. 4 Especially through the Conference of
the Parties (COP), which serves as supreme decision-making body and
mechanism to regularly review and progressively tighten international
3. Edward Wong, Trump Has CalledClimate Change a Chinese Hoax. Beiing Says It Is Anything
But., N.Y. TIES (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/asia/chinatrump-climate-change.html.
4. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, et al., Int'l Relations and Global Climate Change, The History
and Legal Structure of the Global Climate Change Regime at 24, Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research (2001).
5. See generally Paris Agreement in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change [UNFCCC], Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session,
Addendum, at 21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/1O/Add.I(Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter PA]. For
Decision I/CP.21 of the Conference of the Parties to which the Paris Agreement is attached, see
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Decision I/CP.21, in COP Report No. 21, Addendum, at 2,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add/1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter PD].
6. See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. A/AC/23718 (Part II)/Add. 1, 31 J.L.M. 849 (May,
9, 1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
7. See generally Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 J.L.M. 22 (Dec. 10, 1997)
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
8. See generally Conference of the Parties, Rep. ofthe Conf of the Partieson its Fifteenth Session,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/llAdd.1, Decision 2/CP/15, at4 (Mar.30, 2010) [hereinafter
Copenhagen Accord].
9. UNFCCC, supra note 6, art. 2.
10. See generally id.
11. Id.arts.
4.1, 12.
12. Id.art. 4.2(a).
13. Id.art. 4.2(b).
14. Id.art. 4.3.
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climate law,'5 the UNFCCC is alive and well.16 But this cannot be said
about the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord.
The Kyoto Protocol grew out of the UNFCCC.'7 Sparing developing
countries, it imposed on developed countries ambitious targets and
timetables.s These were mollified by flexibility-and-market mechanisms to
internationally transfer mitigation outcomes. 9 Ultimately, however, the
Kyoto Protocol failed to deliver. After the first commitment period expired,
a second commitment period under the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto
Protocol, with tightened obligations for even fewer countries and the
European Union,20 never entered into force.21
While the international community debated whether the Kyoto Protocol
should be extended or replaced by a new global climate treaty, the
Copenhagen Accord emerged in a political intermezzo.22 Independent of
the uncertainties surrounding its status,2 3 the Copenhagen Accord, as
incorporated into the UNFCCC's ambit,24 offered a new paradigm for
achieving mitigation goals: self-declared national emission limitation pledges
submitted by all countries.25 But the horizon of the Copenhagen Accord did
not extend beyond 2020.26
The package that emerged in Paris comprises several components.
Foremost, the Paris Decision, which was taken by the conference of the
parties, provided the vehicle for formally adopting the Paris Agreement-a
new international instrument with legal force, defining how countries will
implement their UNFCCC commitments after 2020.27 Ahead of the
15. Id. art. 7.
16. See generally Annalisa Savaresi, The Paris Agreement: Reflections on an International Law
Odyssey, 13 EUR. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 1 (2016).
17. UNFCCC, supra note 6, at 869.
18. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at 34, 42; UNFCCC, supra note 6, at 872.
19. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at 34 35, 38, 40.
20. Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
Rep. of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its

Eighth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1, annex I (Feb. 28, 2013).
21. See Press Release, UJNFCCC, Doha Amendment (Sept. 28, 2018) (reporting that (1) 144
instruments of acceptance are required for the entry into force of the amendment; and (2) as of
March 15, 2018, 111 parties have deposited their instruments of acceptance).

22. See generally Lavanya Rajamani, The Making and Unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord, 59
Q. 824 (2010).

INT'L & COMP. L.

23. Id. at 828 31 (discussing that neither a decision of the Conference of the Parties nor an
independent plurilateral agreement, but a political rather than a legal instrument).

24. Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AmI. J. INT'L L.
288, 292 (2016) (referring to the 2010 Cancun Agreements).

25. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 8, T 4, app. I (developed countries identify their
quantified economy-wide emission targets), app. II (developing countries describe their
nationally appropriate mitigation actions).

26. See Bodansky, supra note 24, at 292.
27. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, at 1 (June
2017),

https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/20 17/06/paris -climate -agreement- qa.pdf

[hereinafter Paris Climate Agreement Q&A].
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conference, more than 180 countries had already submitted their intended
emission reduction pledges.28 Finally, a host of non-state actors were invited
to offer their contributions.29
The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016.30 Despite
its relative youth, it spawned reams of insightful commentary. Most
reviewers have either discussed its provisions or peeled out singular features
of interest. My article offers a fresh look at the Paris Agreement in homage
to the late Professor David J. Bederman of Emory Law School and his
unique pedagogical mastery in unpacking and repackaging the highly
abstract and somewhat mercurial legal themes so characteristic of
international law and practice. In his chef-d'oeuvre, International Law
Frameworks,3 1 Professor Bederman poses three overarching questions with
regard to the existence and essence of international law. Why do so many
people believe it does not exist?32 Why does international law still seem to
be the stepchild of legal studies? 33 Why do international lawyers appear to
"have a perpetual chip on their shoulder?" 34 Exploring these questions,
Professor Bederman confronts and debunks six myths about international
law and international legal practice.35 His six myths lend themselves
superbly to elucidate recent developments in the evolving field of
international climate law, especially in the light of recent efforts in the
United States to sideline the Paris Agreement in the public eye.

II.

The Six Myths

The myths identified by Professor Bederman revolve around the
following six assertions: first, international law is its own, separate, and
distinct legal system; second, international law is all theory and no practice;
third, international law is not real law; fourth, no one obeys international
law; fifth, international law is what the United States says it is; and sixth,
international lawyers are not real lawyers.36 The following sections discuss
and refute each myth for international climate law under the Paris
Agreement.

28. Id. at 1 2.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 1.
31. See generally DAVID J.
Press 2001).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 6 12.

BEDERMAN,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW FRAMEWORKS (Foundation
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FIRST MYTH

1. Assertion: The ParisAgreement Is Its Own, Separate, and Distinct
Legal System
The myth that international law is distinct and separate from the domestic
legal systems 37 evokes a dualist worldview according to which the Paris
Agreement and domestic law subsist in walled off silos. In the literature,
dualism and monism have been used as didactic tools in two different
3
contexts. 8
Some scholars have understood monism and dualism to elucidate the
relationship between international law and domestic law.39 Under this view,
dualism advances that domestic law and international law differ in their
subject, sources, and contents. 40 Along these lines it could be said, for
example, that international law is made by treaties, whereas domestic law is
created through statutes. Radical dualism allows both legal orders to coexist albeit in strict separation.41 Moderate dualism recognizes a certain
degree of overlap between international law and domestic law when norms
of one legal order refer to the other or when norms are transferred from one
order to the other.42 In contrast to dualism, monism views international law
43
and domestic law joined with and part of the internal order of a state.
Monism then has to resolve ensuing questions of rank in favor of giving
44
primacy to one or the other legal order.
Pursuant to an alternative scholarly understanding, monism and dualism
describe different types of legal systems. 45 Dualist states accord no special
force to treaties absent incorporating legislation.46 For monist states, duly
7
concluded treaties become automatically part of the internal legal orders.4
In practice though, many legal systems exhibit dualist and monist elements.48
At first sight, the creation of the Paris Agreement by states and for states
as well as its inability to impose substantive domestic legal obligations on the
executive and judicial branches appear to exude the dualist flavor of
37.

BEDERMAN, supra note

38. See

31, at 6.

DAVID SLOSS, DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF TREATIES IN THE OXFORD GUIDE TO

TREATIES

368 (Duncan B. Hollis, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2012).

39. Id.

40. Id.
41. MICHAEL SCHWEITZER, STAATSRECHT III: STAATSRECHT, VOLKERRECHT, EUROPA-

12 T 32 (10th ed., 2010).
42. Id. at 12, T 33.

RECHT,

43. SLOSS, supra note 38, at 368 69.

44. Georg Dahm, Jost Delbriick & Riidiger Wolfrum, Volkerrecht / Die Grundlagen. Die
Vokerrecthssubjekte (De Gruyter 1988).
45. SLOSS, supra note 38, at 368.
46. Id. at 369.

47. Id.
48. Id.; see also D. A. Jeremy Telman, A Monist Supremacy Clause and a Dualistic Supreme Court:

The Status of Treaty Law as U.S. Law. (Marko Novakovic ed., 2013), available at SSRN: https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2265880.
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separation suggested by the first myth. But a closer look reveals "extensive
contemporary interaction" 49 between the Paris Agreement and the domestic
realms of its parties.
2.

Rebuttal: InteractionsBetween the ParisAgreement and the Domestic
Realms

A first set of interactions stems from the unique domestic processes that
had to play out within the system of each prospective party before it could
give its consent to being bound by and join the Paris Agreement. A different
set of interactions is worked into the design of the nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement.
a.

Domestic Approvals

In 2016, the World Resources Institute published a valuable survey
covering the domestic approval of the Paris Agreement by the top 100
greenhouse gas emitters.50 The study found that emitters fell into one of
five broad categories of domestic approval: first, by the executive alone;
second, by the executive coupled with additional requirements or practices
such as legislative notification; third, by the executive and the majority
consent of the legislature or one legislative body; fourth, by the executive
and a super majority of the legislature or one legislative body; and fifth, by
multiple executive and legislative bodies.5' Within this classification grid,
52
the United States joined the Paris Agreement under the first category.
53
The European Union (EU) fell into the fifth category.
i.

United States

For the United States, President Obama opted to join the Paris
Agreement by way of a sole executive agreement,5 4 as opposed to seeking
approval from the Senate under the treaty clause of the Constitution55 or
from both houses of Congress through a federal statute under the Foreign
Commerce Clause.56 The precise sources of authority for proceeding by
49.

GILLIAN

PRACTICES

D.

TRIGGS,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW:

CONTEMPORARY

PRINCIPLES

AND

154 (Butterworths Law 2006).

50. See Eliza C. Northrop & Chad Smith, Domestic Processes
for Joining the Paris Agreement,

at 2 (Sept. 2016), https://www.wri.org/publication/domesticprocesses-joining-paris-agreement.
51. Id.at 3.
52. Id.at 4.
53. Id.
54. See Daniel Bodansky, Legal Options for U.S.Acceptance of a New Climate Change Agreement,
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions at 14 (May 2015), https://www.c2es.org/document/
legal -options -for-u-s-acceptance -of-a-new-climate -change -agreement/ [hereinafter U.S.
Acceptance]; Gwynne Taraska & Ben Bovarnick, The Authority for U.S. Participatiop inthe Paris
Climate Agreement (July 2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-contentluploads/2015/07/
InternationalExecutiveAgreements-reporti .pdf.
55. U.S.Acceptance, supra note 54, at 5,14.
56. Id.at 5 6, 13 14.
WORD RESOURCES INSTITUTE
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executive agreement were never publicly articulated by the Obama
administration.57 Supporters of this approval route could invoke the
president's core constitutional power to communicate with foreign
governments. 5 8 Another argument could be that the Senate had already
given its advice and consent for the UNFCCC through which, after all, the
Paris Agreement was adopted.59 Moreover, it could be said that the
president relied on extant domestic statutory and regulatory authorities, such
as those under the Clean Air Act and the Energy Policy Act.60 Finally, one
could argue that binding greenhouse gas reduction promises and new
binding financial commitments, which may have called for the involvement
of the legislative power, are conspicuously absent from the Paris Agreement
itself.61
Critics of President Obama's approval by sole executive agreement have
spoken of an unconstitutional move by a Democrat administration to bypass
a Republican Congress.62 Others have posited that the United States never
really joined the Paris Agreement because the Paris Agreement could not be
conceptualized as an executive agreement in light of the unusually long delay
associated with a withdrawal.63
Yet, the president's choice for approving the Paris Agreement domestically
was never challenged in court. This may be due to the gatekeeper doctrines
of "standing" and "political questions" which patrol the doors to the federal
courtroom in the United States.64
57.

STEPHEN

P.

MULLLIGAN,

CONG.

RESEARCH

SERV.,

R44761,

WITHDRAWAL

FROM

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND THE IRAN

(2017), at 16.
58. Id. at 16 17.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885,
918 (2016). See also U.S. Acceptance, supra note 54, at 15 17.
62. For specific references to newspaper editorials and a congressional resolution that was
introduced but never enacted, see Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 61, at 886 n.3.
63. Eugene Kontorovich, The U.S. Can't Quit the Paris Climate Agreement Because It Never
Actually Joined, WASH. POST (June 1, 2017), https://www.washington.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/06/01/the-u-s-cant-quit-the-paris-climate-agreement-because-it-neveractually-joined/?noredirect=on&utm term=.d77d79e59440. But see Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties arts. 46.1, 46.2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (offering that: (1) "[a] State
may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation
of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its
consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of
fundamental importance;" and (2) "[a] violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to
any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith").
While the United States is not a party, it "considers many of the provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law of
treaties." See U.S. Dep't of State, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, https://www
.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/701 39.htm.
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT,

64.

MARTIJN WILDER AM ET AL., BAKER MCKENZIE, THE PARIS AGREEMENT: PUTTING

THE FIRST UNIVERSAL CLIMATE CHANGE TREATY IN CONTEXT

15 (2016).
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Under the traditional test for standing to sue, potential plaintiffs would
have been required to show a particularized injury that could fairly be traced
to the president's approval of the Paris Agreement by executive agreement
and that could be redressed by a favorable court decision.65 Individual
litigants would be hard pressed to show a personal stake accruing from
President Obama's approval choice.66 Any direct injury to individual parties
could only come from domestic regulations spurred by the Paris Agreement
as opposed to the Paris Agreement itself.67 Even Senators claiming that their
prerogative to give advice and consent was infringed by the president's
approval by sole executive agreement would have found themselves
confronted with the U.S. Supreme Court's narrow view of a personal stake
in the context of "legislative standing."68 They would have needed to
advance arguments that were difficult to make: that President Obama's
choice completely nullified their votes and that they were left without any
legislative remedy whatsoever.69
A conceptually different, but likewise real litigation risk for challenging a
president's approval choice is associated with the operations of the political
question doctrine, which is triggered when a court, in the process of
querying whether it is seized of a matter, looks to the system of political
accountability as the best mechanism to resolve a matter.70 This gatekeeper
may likewise have deterred potential challengers from going to court, as the
issues surrounding President Obama's choice for approving the Paris
Agreement could be deemed so politically charged that federal courts would
not hear the controversy for lack of justiciability.71
ii. European Union
In light of the internal allocation of powers between the EU and its
Member States, there are actually two domestic approval dimensions with
regard to the Paris Agreement. One exists in the relationship between the
EU and the Paris Agreement. The other touches the separate internal
acceptances of the Paris Agreement by each individual EU Member State.
Internationally, the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement allow for the
membership of regional economic integration organizations.72 The EU was
thus able to join the Paris Agreement alongside its Member States.
65. U.S. Acceptance, supra note 54, at 19.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 20.
68. Id.
69. Wells Bennett, Homeland Security: About That Legislative Standing Doctrine, LAWFAREBLOG
.COM (June 16, 2012), https://www.lawfareblog.com/about-legislative-standing-doctrine.
70. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
71. U.S. Acceptance, supra note 54, at 19 (referring to Supreme Court's Goldwater v. Carter,

444 U.S. 996 [1979], decision and the Eleventh Circuit's Made in USA Foundation v. United
States, 242 F.3d 1300 [11th Cir. 2001], decision, but noting that "the Supreme Court has shown

a greater willingness to adjudicate separation of powers disputes relating to foreign affairs").
72. UNFCCC, supra note 6, at art. 22; PA, supra note 5, art. 20.
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Within the integration system of the EU, powers in the environment
sphere are shared between the EU and its Member States. 73 In consequence,
the EU, proceeding under EU law, and the Member States, proceeding
under their own domestic laws, had to pool their respective powers in a
"mixed agreement" for purposes of joining the Paris Agreement.r4 On
behalf of the EU and in pursuance of EU law,T5 the EU's Council of
Ministers, acting by qualified majority and having regard to the proposal by
the European Commission and the consent of the European Parliament,
passed its decision on the conclusion of the Paris Agreement.r6 This
decision by the EU legislature embodies the EU's regional approval of the
Paris Agreement.
In contrast to U.S. law, primary EU law explicitly provides for a judicial
review component prior to the EU's entering into an external agreement
with third countries. Any Member State, as well as the European
Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the European Commission, may
seek an opinion from the European Court of Justice as to whether the
envisaged agreement would be compatible with the EU treaties. 77 If the
court's opinion is adverse, the EU could only enter the external agreement
once the EU treaties were amended accordingly.78 As existing authorities for
the EU's entering the Paris Agreement had never been in dispute, the
European Court of Justice was not asked to assess the compatibility of the
Paris Agreement with the EU treaties.
b.

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)

The NDCs under the Paris Agreement79 constitute the centerpiece of the
new international climate regime. They embody a bottom-up approachso
towards stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations as contemplated by the
UNFCCC. 8I NDCs are self-defined and unilaterally declared by each
party. 82 This means that the substantive plans communicated by each party
are not part of the Paris Agreement itself. Rather, each party decides
domestically what the exact contents of the international obligation will be
73. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 192,
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
74. VAUGHNE MILLER, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., EU EXTERNAL AGREEMENTS: EU

AND

UK PROCEDURES, at 10 12 (Mar. 28, 2016), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/
documents/CBP-7192/CBP-7192.pdf.
75. TFEU, supra note 73, art. 218.
76. Council Decision (EU) 2016/1841, of 5 Oct. 2016 on the conclusion, on behalf of the
European Union, of the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 2016 O.J. (L 282) 1, 2.
77. MILLER, supra note 74, at 16.

78. Id.
79. PA, supra note 5, art. 3.
80. Bodansky, supra note 24, at 289, 300 01, 316 17.

81. UNFCC, supra note 6, art. 2.
82. Bodansky, supra note 24, at 300.
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for it individually.83 Finally, the Paris Agreement invites parties to adjust
their NDCs at any time "with a view to enhancing its level of ambition."84
While geared towards the tightening of NDCs in-between submission
intervals, the language may have created an open flank for parties
endeavoring to eventually walk back their NDCs.85
The first set of final NDCs prepared by each party to the Paris Agreement
and recorded in the UNFCCC's NDC registry6 exhibit notable differences
among the individual submissions. It also reveals a deep interconnectivity
between international goal attainment and domestic action.
i. Discrepancy Among Individual Submissions
Individual NDCs submitted by the various countries differ widely in
format, scope, contents, detail, and length. The great variance among
NDCs makes it quite challenging to understand and compare them.s Yet,
transparency and comparability are essential for assessing how the NDCs
fare in terms of global mean warming by 2100 and what this means for
scaling up national climate efforts.
A built-in differentiation among individual NDCs results of course from
the remnants of the firewall between developed and developing countries.
Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries "should take the lead by
undertaking economy-wide absolute reduction targets." 88 Developing
countries "should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are
encouraged to move towards economy-wide emission reduction or
limitation targets in the light of their particular circumstances."89
While the NDCs submitted by developed countries aim for economywide absolute emission reduction targets, individual pledges vary
significantly in the targets and reference years that were put forward. For
example, the United States has communicated its plan to reduce its
economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28 percent below its 2005
level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28 percent. 90
The EU and its Member States have identified a target of at least 40 percent
83. See id.
84. PA, supra note 5, art. 4.11.
85. CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE PARIS
AGREEMENT 1 (May 2017), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/05/legal -issues-

related-paris-agreement.pdf.
86. PA, supra note 5, art. 4(12); see generally NDC Registry (Interim), http://www4.unfccc.int/
ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx (showing the first set of NDCs submitted).
87. See, e.g.,
PROGRESS

PARIS

ANKE

OF THE

HEROLD
SUBMITTED

AGREEMENT?,

ET.

AL,

OKO-INSTITUT

NATIONALLY

E.V.,

DETERMINED

IS

IT

POSSIBLE

CONTRIBUTIONS

TO

TRACK

UNDER

THE

(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.oeko.de/fileadmin/oekodoc/Tracking-

progress-of-INDCs.pdf.
88. PA, supra note 5, art. 4.4.
89. Id.

90. NDC Registry (Interim), United States of America First NDC, at 1, 3, https://www4.unfccc
.intlsites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%2States%20ofo2OAmerica%2OFirst
U.S.A.%20First%20NDC %20Submission.pdf [hereinafter United States NDC].
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domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to
1990. 91 Japan's pledge towards post-2020 greenhouse gas emission
reductions contemplates a reduction of 26.0 percent by fiscal year 2030,
compared to 2013, and a reduction of 25.4 percent, compared to 2005.92
Due to their being even less internationally contoured, the NDCs
submitted by developing countries reflect an even wider range in
approaches. These include absolute economy-wide targets, reductions in
emissions intensity per unit of gross domestic product, reductions from
projected business-as-usual emissions, and reductions in per-capita
emissions. 93 Brazil's submission, for example, declares that it will reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by 37 percent below 2005 levels in 2015 and by 43
percent below 2005 levels in 2030.94 China has endeavored to achieve its
emissions peak around 2030 or earlier and lower its carbon dioxide emissions
per unit of the gross domestic product by 60-65 percent from 2025 levels. 95
India's quite elaborate narrative pledges to reduce the emissions intensity of
its gross domestic product by 33-35 percent by 2030 from 2005 levels.96
If NDCs are to become the long-term instrument for achieving and
ratcheting up ambitions to tackle global climate change, national and
international policy makers must be able to understand and compare the way
in which NDCs are aligned with domestic action. Despite the great variance
among NDCs, tracking studies conducted in the wake of the first wave of
submissions 97 have found that implementing the aggregate of all NDCs
could hold the median warming by 2100 to 2.7 to 3.7 degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial levels.98 Although this would be a significant improvement
91. NDC Registry (Interim), European Union First NDC, at 1, at http://www4.unfccc.int/
ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Europeano20Union%20First/LV-03 -06-EU%20INDC
.pdf.
92. NDC Registry (Interim), Japan First NDC, at 1, 3, http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/
PublishedDocuments/Japan / 20First/20150717-japan / 27s / 20INDC.pdf.

93.

HEROLD ET. AL,

supra note 87, at 9.

94. NDC Registry (Interim), Brazil First NDC, at 1 2, http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/

PublishedDocuments/Brazil%/20First/BRAZIL /20iNDC %20english /20FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter Brazil NDC].
95. NDC Registry (Interim), China First NDC, at 5, http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/
PublishedDocuments/China /20First/China%/27s%/20First%/20NDC%/20Submission.pdf
[hereinafter China NDC].
96. NDC Registry (Interim), India First NDC, at 29, http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/
PublishedDocuments/Indiao20First/INDIAo20JNDCo20TO %20UNFCCC.pdf
[hereinafter India NDC].
97. See Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), DAG HAMMARSKJOLD LIBRARY:
GUIDES, http://research.un.org/c.php?g=127572&p=5362958 (last visited Jan. 19,
2019).
98. For a synopsis of various tracking estimates, see Kelly Lavin & Taryn Fransen, Insider: Why
are INDC Studies Reaching Different Temperature Estimates, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE
(Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/1 /insider-why-are -indc-studies -reachingdifferent-temperature-estimates. See also CLMATE TRANSPARENCY, BROWN TO GREEN THE
G20 TRANSITION TO A Low CARBON ECONOMY (2018), https://www.climate -transparency
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Brown-to-Green-Report-2018_rev. pdf (estimating that the
RESEARCH
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over the 4 to 5 degrees Celsius achieved under current policies,99 the
predicted outcome falls far short of keeping the temperature rise to a
maximum of 2 degrees Celsius, if not lower, under the Paris Agreement. 100
ii. Interconnectivity Between International Goal Attainment and Domestic
Action
By design, mitigation goals announced in the various NDCs hinge on
domestic laws, regulations, policies, measures, and programs. For example,
the United States offers in its submission a list of domestic initiatives in
progress that undergird and carry its mitigation goal.101 They include
cutting carbon pollution from new and existing power plants, tightening fuel
economy standards for heavy-duty vehicles, reducing emissions of methane
and hydro fluorocarbons with a high global warming potential, and
decreasing building sector emissions.02 In comparison, Brazil plans to
achieve 18 percent of biofuels and 45 percent of renewables in its energymix by 2030, in addition to restoring 12 million hectares of forest.03 India is
planning to roll out 100 gigawatts of solar.104 China has endeavored to boost
non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to roughly 20 percent, to
increase the volume of forest stock, and to install a national "cap-and-trade"
system.105

As the undoing of the Obama administration's Clean Power Plan (CPP) in
the United States illustrates, domestic politics could very well jeopardize a
country's NDC. The CPP establishes guidelines for states to follow when it
comes to limiting carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants.106 In
the wake of challenges by the several states and various companies and
business groups, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the implementation of the
CPP. 07 Meanwhile, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency of the
Trump administration has proposed to repeal and replace the CPP. 08
G20 pledges, even if kept, would in the aggregate still lead to a temperature rise of 3.2 degrees
Celsius, with 2.5 degrees Celsius attributable to the EU and the United States, 3 to 4 degrees
Celsius to China and more than 4 degrees Celsius to Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia).
99. Id.
100. PD, supra note 5, T17. For more background and context, see Bodansky, supra note 24, at
302 03 (explaining that, in addition to confirming the goals of 2 degrees and 1.5 degrees
envisaged in Copenhagen and Cancun, the Paris agreement set two other long-term, albeit
somewhat vaguely formulated, mitigation goals: (1) a peaking of emissions as soon as possible;
and (2) net greenhouse gas neutrality in the second half of the century).
101. United States NDC, supra note 90, at 5.
102. Id.
103. Brazil NDC, supra note 94, at 3.
104. India NDC, supra note 96, at 9.
105. China NDC, supra note 95, at 5, 14.
106. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
107. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1 (2016).
108. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 82. Fed. Reg. 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60).
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Beyond the fate of the CPP, President Trump announced that the country
would immediately cease implementation of its current NDC.109
Independent and apart from executive action, the U.S. Congress could at
any point decide not to fund expenditures for activities pertaining to the
Paris Agreement.I 0 However this scenario seems very unlikely in the new
era of divided government installed by the American voter in the mid-term
elections of 2018.
The domestic shaping and the envisioned scaling-up of NDCs under the
Paris Agreement have the potential to affect corporate actors and their
bottom line as well as individual parties in their lifestyle choices. For
example, Chevron and Exxon have found themselves under pressure from
their shareholders to stress test their portfolio's resilience in a low carbon
economy as greenhouse gas intensive assets and projects will receive greater
scrutiny."' At Royal Dutch Shell and Beyond Petroleum, shareholders have
filed resolutions urging greater transparency and disclosure with regard to
climate risks and impacts.112
Not only corporations but also individuals could be directly affected by
domestic action designed to ensure successful NDCs. For example,
Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs), which were proposed two decades ago and
studied but never implemented in the United Kingdom, stand for a domestic
economic rationing instrument, which targets individuals as consumers of
energy." 3 TEQs offer a national electronic scheme of quantity-based
personal tradable carbon allowances for all users of energy destined to
enable nations to keep commitments "within whatever international
framework applies at the time."1 4 Specifically, each "adult would receive an
109. President Donald J. Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord
(June 1, 2017), (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
statement-president-trump-paris-climate -accord/).

110. For a recent review of funding for federal climate change activities, see U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE,

GAO-18-223,

CLIMATE

CHANGE

ANALYSIS

OF

REPORTED

FEDERAL FUNDING (2018).

111. Bradley Olson & Nicole Friedmann, Exxon, Chevron shareholders narrowly reject climate

change stress tests,

WALL

STREET

J. (May 25, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-

chevron-shareholders-narrowly-reject-climate -change -stress-tests - 1464206192.
112. See Juliet Phillips & Michael Chaitow, SHAREACTION, Two YEARS AFTER ALMING FOR
'A': WHERE ARE WE Now? (Oct. 2017), https://shareaction.org/wp-contentluploads/2017/10/

InvestorReport-AimingForA-BP.pdf.
113. See, e.g., Shaun Chamberlain, Larch Maxey, & Victoria Hurth, Reconciling Scientific Reality
with Realpolitik: Moving beyond Carbon Pricingto TEQs An Integrated, Economy- Wide Emissions
Cap, 5

CARBON

MANAGEMENT

411, 411 412 (2015);

DAVID

FLEMING

AND

CHAMBERLAIN, HOUSE OF COMMONS ALL PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON PEAK OIL

SHAUN

& THE

LEAN ECON. CONNECTION, TEQs: Tradable Energy Quotas A Policy Frameworkfor Peak Oil and
Climate Change, at 12 (2011); DAVID FLEMING, THE LEAN ECON. CONNECTION, Energy and
the Common Purpose Descending Staircase with Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs), 2 (2007); David

Fleming, Tradable Quotas: Using Information Technology to Cap National CarbonEmissions, 7 EUR.
ENV'T 139, 139 (1997).

114. DAVID FLEMING, THE LEAN ECON. CONNECTION, Energy and the Common Purpose
Descending Staircase with Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs), at 1 (2007).
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equal free entitlement of TEQs units each week."' u Other energy users
from industry to government would bid for their units at a weekly tender or
auction.116 Whenever a user buys fuel or energy, units corresponding to the
amount and "carbon rating" of the fuel or energy purchased would be
deducted from the user's individual TEQs account." 7 Transactions would
generally be automatic using credit card or direct debit technology.IS In
similarity to a cap-and-trade system, users would be able to purchase
additional units or sell surplus units, and the total number of units would be
ratcheted down year-by-year."9 A variant of TEQs called personal carbon
allowances would cover only household emissions.20 To help individuals
understand their contributions to and stakes in climate pollution, a range of
private consumer products have been analyzed for their carbon footprint. A
cup of coffee, for example, has been estimated to emit roughly 60 grams of
carbon dioxide.121 One gallon of gasoline is assumed to produce 8.8
kilograms of carbon dioxide.122 Carbon offset programs offered by airlines
provide customers with the opportunity to reduce the carbon footprint
associated with their trip through the purchase of carbon offsets.23
Passengers first calculate the carbon footprint for their itineraries, then
choose among offset project portfolios, and finally purchase the contribution
amount needed to offset their travel.124 For example, the carbon offset
program offered by United Airlines calculates a one-way ticket between
Washington DC and New Orleans with carbon dioxide emissions of 0.1744
metric tons and a contribution amount of roughly two dollars.25
In recognition of the infra-national dimension of domestic action to
protect the climate, the non-state actor zone for climate action (NAZCA)
was launched to track the visibility and diversity of climate action and to
mobilize broader engagement to help countries achieve and exceed their
national commitments.126 By the time of Paris, the NAZCA's portal listed
roughly 11,000 commitments from 2,250 cities, 22,025 companies, and
27
hundreds of states and regions, investors, and civil society organizations.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Chamberlain, Maxey & Hurth, supra note 113, at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

121. Tchibo GmbH, Case Study Tchibo Privat Kaffee Rarity Machare, PCF Pilot Project
Germany, 26 (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.pcf-projekt.de/files/1232962944/pcfctchibo-coffee

.pdf.
122. U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION
AND AIR

QUALITY,

AGENCY,

EMISSION FACTS:

EPA 420-F-05-004, OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION
GREENHOUSE

GAS EMISSIONS

FROM

ATYPICAL

PASSENGER VEHICLE, at 4 (Feb. 2005).
123. United Eco-Skies, United's Carbon Offset Program, http://co2offsets.sustainabletravelin
temational.org/ua/offsets/trip (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, supra note 27, at 3.
Id.
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This showing of support from all corners of society has been widely credited
as a key dynamic facilitating the rise of the Paris Agreement.128
c.

Adaptation

In the climate arena, adaptation, which offers another example for
international and domestic interactions, may be described as the art of
learning how to cope and live with a changing climate. Adaptation unfolds
locally, though not necessarily according to political lines. As developing
countries are more vulnerable and less resilient to the impacts of climate
change, they have pushed for a more vigorous international conversation
about adaptation.
In comparison to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the
Copenhagen Accord, the Paris Agreement places a greater emphasis on
adaptation.129 It thus acknowledges the reality and significance of adaptation
independent of the collective action issues surrounding mitigation.30 Just as
parties will submit mitigation contributions, the Paris Agreement calls on all
parties to plan for and implement adaptation efforts.'3' It further encourages
all parties to communicate their efforts and needs.32 Finally, adaptation will
be a component of the global stocktake cycles and scaled-up financial
resources. 133
Parties to the Paris Agreement have already submitted adaptation
language identifying priorities and needs as part of their NDCs. 134
Emphasizing the social dimension of adaptation, Brazil identifies housing
and basic infrastructure for health, sanitation, and transportation as core risk
areas. 35 In addition to announcing the acceleration of its own national
strategy for climate adaptation, China calls for the institutional recognition
of adaptation in the international climate framework by creating a new
subsidiary body with an adaption portfolio.36
B.

SECOND MYTH

1. Assertion: The ParisAgreement Is All Theory and No Practice
This myth suggests that international climate law under the Paris
Agreement simply lacks practical relevance. It leverages a presentiment
among many that climate change, in the way it works and affects everyday
life, proves too abstract and too temporally distant.
128. Id.

129. PA, supra note 5, arts. 3, 7, 9.4, 14.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Bodansky, supra note 24, at 308.
Id
Id.
Id. at 309.

134. See Brazil NDC, supra note 94, at 2; China NDC, supra note 95, at 33 34.
135. Brazil NDC, supra note 94, at 3.

136. China NDC, supra note 95, at 20, 34.
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The assertion advanced by the myth exhibits a "kernel of truth"'137 in the
climate arena, as broad principles have served as guideposts along the
trajectory towards achieving the objectives of international climate law. In
this tradition, the Paris Agreement recalls not only the principles earlier
espoused by the UNFCCC, but also underlines "the principle of equity and
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the
light of different national circumstances[.]"138 Equity involves resolving
questions of how to address imbalances between capacities to cope with
climate change and questions of how to temper climate change impacts on
vulnerable population segments. 39 Common but differentiated
responsibilities, which is the operationalization of equity, constitutes the
core distributive paradigm behind the distinction between developed
countries and developing countries under the Paris Agreement.40
In addition to the level of abstraction enveloping the guiding principles of
the Paris Agreement, it may be hard to comprehend that, in the context of a
global carbon cycle with tens of thousands of gigatons, an anthropogenic
contribution in the single digits should be the culprit behind climate
change.'41 Moreover, future damages and injuries resulting from climate
142
change may seem too far away and removed from possible causal events.
Climate change, which works over longer-term horizons, is different from
the here and now of the weather. This may very well be why, in a shrewd
effort to fudge the conceptual difference between both terms and rally
support from the broader population for binding global targets to restrict
greenhouse gases in the 1990s, President Clinton assembled weather
forecasters in the White House to bring home that climate change was
real.y43
2.

Rebuttal: PracticalRelevance of the ParisAgreement

The myth of too much theory and no practice relies on basic truisms.
Obviously, there is nothing unusual about the deployment of theory and
meta-norms when identifying, explaining, applying, and enforcing the law.
137. BEDERMAN, supra note 31, at 8.
138. PA, supra note 5, pmbl.
139. See, e.g., Ellen Wiegandt, Climate Change, Equity and InternationalNegotiations, INT'L REL.
AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 127 (Urs Luterbacher & Detlef F. Sprinz eds., The MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA & London 2001); Bert Metz, InternationalEquity in Climate Change
Poliy, 1 INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT 111 (2000).

140. See Harald Winkler & Lavanya Rajamani, Common but Differentiated Responsibility and
Respective Capabilities in a Regime Applicable to All, 14 CLMATE POL. 102, 103 (2014), http://
gdrights.org/wp-contentluploads/2013/06/Winkler-Rajamani-2013-CBDRRC.pdf.
141. J.S. Bhatti, M.J. Apps & R. Lal, Anthropogenic Changes and the Global Carbon Cycle,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND MANAGED ECOSYSTEMS 72 76 (.S. Bhatti, R. Lal, M.J. Apps & M.A.
Price eds.) (CRC Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton, FL 2006).
142. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring f'hats Environmental About Environmental Law in the
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 745 48 (2000).
143. Martha Joynt Kumar,

MANAGING THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE: THE WHITE HOUSE

COMMUNICATIONS OPERATION 39 40

(The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore 2007).
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Legal methodology and legal operations in any specialty field have
traditionally been informed by history, philosophy, sociology, economics,
and anthropology. International climate law adds a healthy dose of science
to the mix. Moreover, climate litigation has become a practice area
increasingly occupying the courts.
a.

Climate Science

The central role of science in the climate arena raises a host of serious
questions requiring real answers. What is the best, if not settled science, in a
milieu of uncertainty? Who are the scientists? How robust and reliable are
their data, methodologies, and models? If one thinks of science as the facts,
policy as the decisions, and politics as the act of selling the facts and
decisions, how do and how should they interact?
In light of these questions the presence of a trusted and trustworthy
repository of scientific information and knowledge is of utmost practical
relevance. Despite the Climategate kerfuffle of the past, 144 the International
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)-a creature of the World Meteorological
Organization and United Nations Environment Programme-is still widely
considered to be that storehouse and authoritative source of the latest
scientific consensus in the climate arena. 14 Even courts rely on the work
conducted by the IPCC. Dutch courts have sounded a particularly robust
signal in this regard. When ordering the Dutch government to reduce
carbon emissions by at least twenty-five percent by the end of 2020, the
Hague District Court invoked the IPCC's reports as the scientific basis
undergirding its determination precisely because it considered them the
most authoritative crystallization of a rigorous process and consensus among

144. For a detailed account, see Axel Bojanowski, Forscherskandal:Heier Krieg urns Klima,
(May 3, 2010), at http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaftlnatur/climategate-allesueber-den-skandal-in-der-klimaforschung-a-688175.html.

SPIEGEL ONLINE

145. See IPCC Factsheet: fWhat is the IPCC? INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.ipcc.ch/news and events/docs/factsheets/FS-what-ipcc

CHANGE

.pdf. For the IPCC's latest special report, a massive survey on the state of global warming,

spanning three years of work by more than 130 authors, who relied on over 6,000 scientific
references and fielded over 42,000 expert and government review comments, see International

Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5°C An IPCC special report on the impacts
of global warming of 1.5°C above -pre -industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas
emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate

change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (2018), at http://www.ipcc.ch/
report/srl5/ (warning that the 1.5 degrees Celsius tipping point, with catastrophic
consequences, could already be reached in 2040 or even earlier, which means that carbon
emission reductions must start immediately to achieve a halving by 2030 and carbon neutrality
by 2050).
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all government participants.146 The judgment has meanwhile been upheld
47
by the Hague Court of Appeal.'
b.

Climate Litigation

Litigation in the climate arena is serious business. Not surprisingly,
lawsuits have been on the rise. 148 The advent of the Paris Agreement will
49
reinforce this trend at all levels: international, regional, and domestic.
i. International
On the international plane, climate law could conceivably come before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in two ways-either through a
contentious proceeding between states' 50 or through a request from within
the UN-system for an advisory opinion.'51 The odds for contentious cases
appear rather dim because the Paris Agreement purposely does not boast a
compromissory clause or any other dispute settlement mechanism involving
international tribunals. It is also unlikely that states will give their consent
to climate litigation before the ICJ outside the Paris Agreement. But climate
themes could indirectly reach the ICJ in the context of its own charge to
protect and preserve rights of litigants, 52 for example, when it comes to
environmental study and planning. In this vein, the ICJ has already decided
that it is now considered a requirement under general international law to
conduct an environmental impact statement when a proposed industrial
activity may have significant adverse transboundary effects, especially in the
context of shared resources. 5 3 At the same time, the ICJ held that the scope
and the contents of environmental impact assessments have not yet been
defined.,54
More promising than a contentious case would be a request for an
advisory opinion. But this route requires convincing the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) or the United Nations Security Council
146. Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396,
2.8 2.21 (June 24, 2015), noted in Johannes Saurer & Kai Purnhagen, Klimawandel vor Gericht

Der Rechtsstreitder NichtregierungsorganisationUrgenda"gegen die Niederlande und seine Bedeutung
fur Deutschland, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT

FILR UMWELTRECHT (ZUR) 16 (2016).

147. Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396 (Oct. 9,
2018).
148. See Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach, The Status of Climate Change Litigation A Global
Review, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME & SAHIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE AT COLUMBIA, (May 2017) (reporting 900 cases in 24 countries as of March 2017).

149. For searchable databases of climate change law for U.S. and non-U.S. litigation, see The
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Climate Change Litigation Databases, at http://
climatecasechart.com.

150. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 36, 34 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
151. U.N. Charter art. 96; ICJ Statute, art. 65.
152. ICJ Statute, supra note 150, art. 65.

153. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urn.), 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 135,
154. Id. T 205.
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(UNSC) to make the request. 55 To this end the Ambassadors for
Responsibility on Climate Change have been lobbying the UNGA to submit
a request covering the obligations of states to prevent the harmful
consequences of anthropogenic climate change.156 This campaign is still in
progress.
ii. Regional
On the regional plane, EU climate litigation has in great measure
concerned the national allocation plans (NAPs) under the EU's Emissions
Trade System (ETS).1 7 NAPs reflect the decisions by each EU country as
to the allocation of their emission allowances; and their sum initially set the
overall cap under the EU's ETS.158 Several decisions by the European
Commission with regard to the NAPs were challenged before the ECJ. 159
Avoiding the legal uncertainties typically associated with litigation
constituted one of the factors informing the EU's switch to an EU-wide cap
set at the EU level for the phase covering 2013 to 2020.160
For the EU, the recent "People's Climate Case" could break new grounds.
Eight petitioners from Europe, joined by a family from Kenya and one from
the Fiji Islands, have sued the EU's legislature before the General Court,
which serves as a court of first instance for actions brought by natural
persons against the institutions.161 The petitioners do not seek damages, but
allege a failure by the EU to strengthen its climate target for 2030 from the
current 40% less carbon dioxide to a minimum of 50-60% over 1990 levels,
which they consider technically and economically feasible.162 As a basis for
155. See U.N. Charter art. 96.
156. See, e.g., Doug Kysar, Climate Change & the InternationalCourt ofJustice, Yale Law School,
Public Law Research Paper No. 315 (Aug. 15, 2013), at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm

?abstract id=2309943; Philippe Sands QC, Climate Change and the Rule of Law: Adjudicating the
Future in InternationalLaw, 28 J. ENVTL. L. 19 (2016).
157. See generally, Jon Birger Skjarseth and Jorgen Wettestad, EU EMISSIONS TRADING:
DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION (Routhledge, Oxon & New York
2016).
158. Karoline Rogge, Joachim Schleich & Regina Betz, An Early Assessment of National
Allocation Plans for Phase 2 of EU Emission Trading, (Sustainability and Innovation Nr. S,
INITIATION,

Working Paper, 2006), https://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/isi/dokumente/sustainabili
ty-innovation/2006/WTP -2006_Ano20Earlyo20Assessment %20of%20National%20Alloca
tion%20Plans %20foro20Phaseo202 %20ofo20EUo20Emisson.pdf.
159. Singh Ghaleigh, Emissions Trading before the European Court ofyustice: Market Making in
Luxembourg,

LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING KYOTO, COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND

12

(David Freestone & Charlotte Steck eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
160. National Allocation Plans, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
cap-en.
161. Familien klagen gegen zu schwache EU-Klimapolitik [Families Complain About too Weak EU
Policy], PEOPLE'S CLIMATE CASE (May 24, 2018), https://peoplesclimatecase.caneurope.org/
de/2018/05/familien-klagen-gegen-zu-schwache-eu-klimapolitik/.
162. Susanne Ehlerding, Familien Verklagen EU auf Mehr Klimaschutz, DER TAGESSPIEGEL
(May 25, 2018), https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/umweltschutz-familien-verklagen-eu-aufmehr-klimaschutz/22601620.html.
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their lawsuit, the petitions invoke protections pertaining to the exercise of
their profession and their property rights under the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.163 Their action for failure to act, as the
proceeding is known in EU vernacular, will however face significant hurdles
in its admissibility stage. 164 Arguably, the concern of the petitioners in this
case is not sufficiently individualized, as climate change touches
everybody.65 If the General Court decides not to admit the case or deny its
merits, plaintiffs could still petition the European Court of Justice on
appeal.66
In the Americas, petitions proceeding within the Inter-American System
of Human Rights under the auspices of the Organization of American States
have traditionally linked climate change to fundamental rights. For example,
a petition filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) by Earthjustice on behalf of the Arctic Athabaskan Council alleges
that Canada's failure to regulate climate-forcing black carbon emissions
marks the beginning of a causal chain resulting in severe adverse impacts on
the Athabaskan people's culture, property, health, and means of subsistence
in contravention of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man (American Declaration).167 According to the petition, failure to
properly regulate black carbon also results in violations of Canada's duties to
avoid transboundary harm and to protect the environment consistent with
the precautionary principle.168 For relief, the petitioners request an onsite
reconnaissance visit, a hearing and a report by the IACHR declaring that
Canada's failure to regulate domestic black carbon emissions violates the
American Declaration, along with recommendations for measures to limit
black carbon emissions and a plan to protect Arctic Athabaskan culture and
resources from the effects of accelerated Arctic warming and melting.169
Whether or not this petition will be more successful than the Inuit petition
in 2005, which the IACHR ultimately declined to process, remains to be
seen.'y0 But since then, the law has developed. In a recent case involving the
construction and operations of large-scale infrastructure projects in the
Greater Caribbean region, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
rendered a historic advisory opinion declaring that states must take measures
to prevent significant harm to individuals inside and outside their
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

167. See generally Petition to the Inter-American Commission On Human Rights Seeking
Relief from Violations Of the Rights of Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic
Warming and Melting Caused by Emissions of Black Carbon by Canada (Apr. 23, 2013), https:/
/earthjustice.org/sites/defaultlfiles/AACPETITION 13 -04-23 a.pdf.
168. Id. at 52 53.
169. Id. at 86 87.
170. Don McCrimmon, The Athabaskan Petition to the Inter American Human Rights Commission:

Using Human Rights to Respond to Climate Change, 6 THE POLAR J. 398 (2016).
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territory.'r' According to the court, the progressive realization of economic,
social and cultural rights guaranteed by the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention) leads to the existence of an
autonomous right to a healthful environment. 172 In its opinion, the court
made several significant pronouncements that may sustain transboundary
climate litigation, including its recognition of the adverse impact of climate
change on human rights and its new "effective control" test for the
extraterritorial reach of the American Convention.'r3
iii. Domestic
Climate change litigation in domestic courts has faced significant hurdles
in terms of jurisdiction, evidence, and remedies. A case with enormous
potential ramifications comes from Germany. It is so unique because it
advances the proposition that private corporate emitters could be exposed to
liability for interference with the property of others anywhere in the world
even when engaging in lawful activities.
In late 2015, Peruvian farmer Safil Luciano Lliuya filed suit in Germany
against Rheinisch-Westf~ilische Elektrizit~itswerke (RVVE), Germany's
largest energy producer, for its contributions to global warming based on its
total emissions between 1751 and 2010.174 Alleging that global warming is
increasing the threat of glacier lake outburst floods from Lake Palcacocha
that endanger his home in Huaraz, in the foothills of the Andes, the claimant
asked the court to order RAE to reimburse him for roughly half a percent
of the costs he and the local authorities had incurred to establish flood
protections. 17 That percentage, according to Mr. Lliuya, was concomitant
with RWE's contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. 176 Mr. Lliuya
based his claim on liability for interference under section 1004 of the
177
German Civil Code.
171. Advisory Opinion OC-23/18, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (set. A) No. 23 (Nov. 15, 2017), http://
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_23_esp.pdf; discussed in Maria L. Banda, Inter-

American Court of Human Rights' Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights, ASIL
INSIGHTS 22 (May 10, 2018), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/6/inter-americancourt-human-rights -advisory-opinion-environment-and-human#_edn20.
172. Advisory Opinion OC-23/18, supra note 170, TT 62 63 ("el derecho a un medio ambiente
sano como derecho aut6nomo").

173. Id. T 102 ("control efectivo").
174. Dan Collyns, PeruivianFarmer Demands Climate Compensationfrom German Company, THE
(Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/16/
peruvian-farmer-demands-climate -compensation-from-german-company.
175. Lliuya v. RWE AG, 2 0 285/15 Essen Regional Court, on appeal, (2015), http://
blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-casedocuments/2016/20161215_Case-No.-2-O-28515-Essen-Regional-Court decision.pdf.
176. Id.
177. Elisa Chiaro, Corporate Responsibility for Climate Change: Litigation and Other grievance
Mechanisms, DOING BUSINESS RIGHT BLOG (Jan. 2018), http://www.asser.nl/DoingBusiness
Right/Blog/post/corporate -responsibility- for-climate-change-litigation-and-other-grievancemechanisms -by-elisa-chiaro.
GUARDIAN
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RWE asserted that the claim could not be addressed through individual
civil liability in the absence of a causal link between its emissions and
supposed flood risks from the glacial lake.' 78 According to RWE, there was
no legal basis in German law giving rise to liability of a single emitter for
general, ubiquitous environmental pollution.'79
Reasoning that no effective redress was available and that no linear causal
chain between particular greenhouse gas emissions and particular climate
change effects was discernible, the District Court in Essen agreed with RWE
and dismissed Mr. Lliuya's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as well
1
as damages. 80
On appeal the Upper Regional Court in Hamm recognized the complaint
as well-pled and admissible, allowing the case to move into the evidentiary
phase.181 In addition to determining whether glacier lake flooding,
mudslides, or both have seriously threatened Mr. Lliuya's home, the
evidentiary phase is set to explore the following questions.82 Do RWE's
carbon dioxide emissions rise into the atmosphere and contribute to
increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere?83
Does the concentration of greenhouse gas molecules lead to increased heattrapping and rising global temperatures?184 Does the increase in average
temperatures accelerate the melting of the Palcaraju glacier and prevent the
moraine from holding the surging water volumes of the Palcacocha
lagoon?185 Is RWE's share of contribution in the context of the preceding
questions measurable and calculable?186 Do RWE's historical greenhouse
gas emissions amount to roughly half a percent of global emissions since the
beginning of the era of industrialization? 17
While the evidentiary phase must still be seen through to completion and
the case will in all likelihood be appealed, the court's recognition that it is
theoretically possible to trace liability for harms arising from climate change
to a particular corporate defendant at the other end of the world writes legal
history in the climate arena. 88 This holds especially true when considering
that a legal basis comparable to the one used by Mr. Lliuya in Germany may
exist in more than fifty jurisdictions worldwide. 189 Private law, whether in
178. Lliuya, 2 0 285/15 Essen Regional Court (2015).
179. Id.
180. Id.

181. Lliuya v. RFVE, LSE, at T 1.1 (2017) (OLG Hamm), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edulcases/
800 6 2 6 gl.html.
182. Id. I1.1.
183. Id. T 11.2(a).

184. Id. T 111.2(b).
185. Id. T 11.2(c).
186. Id. T 11.2(d)[1].
187. Id. T 11.2(d).
188. See id.
189. Laura Schilfer et al., The Significance of Climate Litigationfor the Political Debate on Loss &
Damage GERMANWATCH 10 (2018), https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/publi
cation/21699.pdf.
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property or tort, could therefore become a powerful arrow in the quiver of
climate change litigants wishing to sue emitters rather than governments. 190
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which has declined to open the door to
public nuisance lawsuits in federal common law because the Clean Air Act
vests the power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency,19' the OLG Hamm explicitly declares
that operating under a lawful permit pursuant to Germany's Federal
Immission Control Law does not foreclose a claim for interference under
192
Germany's Civil Code.
The case beautifully illustrates how plaintiffs may shift their visors from
governments to individual corporate defendants. Mr. Lliuya notably did not
go after the government of Peru although he could conceivably have filed a
petition with the TACHR alleging breaches of his human rights in the wake
of Peru's failure to take precautionary measures against the risk of
flooding'93-for example, by not deploying, at a minimum, what the Paris
Agreement calls "effective early warning systems.'94
C.

THIRD MYTH

1. Assertion: The ParisAgreement Is Not Real Law
The myth of the non-legal nature of international law in general and the
Paris Agreement in particular pairs up the core elements of the myths
assigning to international law the features of separation and the lack of
practical relevance. 195 More specifically, the myth feeds off the diagnosis
that international law does not have the robust government institutions,
compliance mechanisms and enforcement machineries typically present in
the municipal legal orders.96 Due to this carence institutionelle, international
law tends to rely more heavily on reciprocity of conduct or name-and-shame
approaches to nudge its subjects, primarily the nation-states, into its fold.' 97
Outside topically focused treaty frameworks, international environmental
law and international climate law have also relied on soft law instruments.
Soft law, which embodies a somewhat oxymoronic term, stands for
commitments and expressions for preferences that could lead to hard law,
190. Id. at 8 10.
191. American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011); see also Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil, 696 F.3d 849. 855 56 (9th Cir. 2012), writ denied, 569 U.S. 1000 (2013); Karen

Sokol, Seeking ClimateJustice in the Courts, CPRBLOG (May 21, 2018), http://www.progressivere
form.org/CPRBlog.cfn?idBlog=21F2FEAD-CB8A-E6AC-769F43 D28CA7C36B.
192. Lliuya, LSE T 111.2 (2017).
193. Petition and Case System: Informational Brochure, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
5 (2010), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/howto.pdf.
194. PA, supra note 5, art. 8.4(a).

HUMAN RIGHTS

195.

BEDERMAN,

supra note 31, at 9.

196. Id.
197. Id.
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but not necessarily so. 198 Examples of soft law in the climate arena include
the Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change 99 and the Principles on
Climate Obligations of Enterprises.200
Applied to the latest installment of international climate law under the
Paris Agreement, adherents of the third myth may point to the designation
of the nationally determined pledges as "contributions" rather than
"commitments," the non-bindingness of the NDCs, the non-adversarial,
non-punitive transparency framework to review and foster progress, and the
failure to link climate loss and damage to the law of state responsibility for
2 01
international wrongs.
2.

Rebuttal: InternationalClimate Law through the ParisAgreement

International law has existed for thousands of years-in harder and softer
variants depending on the context. In terms of its legal nature and its legal
substance, the Paris Agreement is a source of international law and it also
makes international law.
a.

Legal Nature

In contrast to what the third myth suggests, the Paris Agreement is first
and foremost a treaty under international law. Whether characterized as an
203
ancillary treaty to the UNFCCC202 or a protocol in anything but name,
the Paris Agreement embodies the consent of the parties memorialized in
written form and governed by international law.204
Several considerations support that the Paris Agreement is a treaty by its
legal nature. First, the Paris Agreement is structured in articles as opposed
to paragraphs or recitals.205 Moreover, it includes standard treaty provisions
such as those covering its entry into force and deposit.206 Also, the parties to
198. For a comprehensive discussion of the definitions of soft law, its interactions with treaties

and custom, the reasons for adopting soft law, compliance issues associated with soft law, see
Dinah L. Shelton, Soft Law, in ROLTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (David
Armstrong ed.) (2009).
199. Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations, Oslo Principles on Global Climate
Obligations, 3 Legal Perspectives for Global Challenges (Eleven Int'l Pub'g, The Hague 2015)
(chiefly addressing its principles to states).
200. Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations, Principles on Climate Obligations of
Enterprises, 5 Legal Perspectives for Global Challenges (Eleven Int'l Pub'g, The Hague 2015)
(complementing the Oslo Principles with principles tailored to enterprises as well as financiers
and investors).
201. See generally PA, supra note 5.

202. Annalisa Savaresi, The ParisAgreement: Reflections on an InternationalLaw Odyssey 6, EuR.
L. (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2912001.
203. Annalisa Savaresi, The ParisAgreemnent:A New Beginning?, 34J. EN. &NAT. RES. L. 16, 20
(2016).
204. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2.1(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
Soc'Y OF INT'L

205. See generally PA, supra note 5.

206. Id. art. 21.3.
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the Paris Agreement have considered it to be a treaty under international
law. Finally, there is nothing unusual about an international law treaty that
deploys in one single instrument aspirational, enabling, and non-categorical
language as well as categorical obligations. This technique does not push a
hard source of international law into the non-legal or soft law realm.
b.

Legal Substance

Alongside the exhortative language "should" and "are encouraged" and
the absence of obligations of result invoked by the proponents of the third
myth with regard to the pledges submitted by each party, the Paris
Agreement imposes significant categorical legal obligations of conduct,
which are generally introduced by "shall." Under the Paris Agreement, each
party shall "prepare, communicate and maintain" successive NDCs at fiveyear intervals,207 pursue domestic mitigation measures, 208 and regularly
report on emissions and removals as well and progress. 209 Developed
country parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country
parties and report on financing every two years.21 0 Finally, although the
NDCs are unilaterally declared by each country and filter up, the Paris
Agreement legally requires a review mechanism at the international level
through the COP.211 This "global stocktake" is designed to assess the
collective progress towards achieving the objective of the Paris Agreement
and its long-term goals.212 It will provide valuable feedback to the parties
with regard to updating and enhancing their actions. The first global
stocktake is slated for 2023 and every five years thereafter.213
D.

FOURTH MYTH

1. Assertion: No One Obeys the ParisAgreement
The myth that ascribes a voluntary and relativist nature to the Paris
Agreement misappropriates a realist world of international law and
international relations, a world that is purely driven by national selfinterest.214 This myth is harder to debunk because nation-states tend to

obey more seamlessly when international community norms happen to
215
coincide with the individual self-interest of a country.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. arts. 4.2, 4.9.
Id. art. 4.2.
Id. art. 13.7(a) (b).
Id.arts. 9.1, 9.5,
PA, supra note 5, art. 16.4.
Id.arts. 14.1, 14.3.
Id.art. 14.2.
214. BEDERMAN, supra note 31, at 11.
215. Id.
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2.

Rebuttal: The ParisAgreement and Its Performance Record

a.

Early Successes

Climate governance under the Paris Agreement, which leverages the
domestic and the international planes, does not comport with traditional
notions of compliance and enforcement as hallmarks of legality or
illegality.216 While the Paris Agreement requires submission of NDCs, the
parties define and shape the contents and objectives of their individual
NDCs in reflection of what they are willing and able to accomplish
domestically. This hybridization of international process and domestic
contents has thus far proven successful as the NDCs in the UNFCCC
registry now represent a stunning 95% of global greenhouse gas
21
emissions. 7
b.

Enhanced Transparency Framework

Under the Paris Agreement, each party will have the opportunity to study
the pledges and adaptation progress made by the other parties, the
challenges they have confronted, and the kind of support that could help
avoid failure and foster success. 218 In this sense, the "enhanced transparency
framework" of the Paris Agreement, under which the inventories of
emissions and removals and the progress reports submitted by each country
will be subjected not only to independent reviews by technical experts and
but also to a "facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress" by fellow
parties,219 may be described as compliance assistance-a tool not unknown to
even the sternest among enforcement agencies in domestic contexts. 220 The
friendly solidarity dynamics built into this non-punitive and non-adversarial
framework, as well as the involvement of non-state actors, may even lead to a
race to the top in a spirit of collectively supported competition.
c.

Orderly Exit

International law binds states to observe and fulfill the commitments they
have undertaken in international law treaties.221 This fundamental norm,
216. Ann-Marie Slaughter, The Paris Approach to Global Governance 1, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(Dec. 28, 2015), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/iles/slaughter/fles/projectsyndicate
12.28.2015.pdf.
217. Thomas Day et al., Conditionality of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs),
INT'L PARTNERSHIP ON MITIGATION AND MRV 2 (Feb. 2016), https://www.transparency-part
nership.net/sites/default/files/indc-conditionality-0.pdf.
218. PA, supra note 5, arts. 4.8, 7.5.
219. Id. art.13.11.
220. See, e.g., Resources and Guidance Documents for Compliance Assistance, EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources-and-guidance-documents-compliance-assistance
("The
compliance assistance program provides businesses, federal facilities, local governments and
tribes with tools to help meet environmental regulatory requirements. Compliance assistance
tools and methods include one-to-one counseling, online resource centers, fact sheets, guides
and training.").
221. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VIRGINIA L. Rev. 1579, 1580 (2005).
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which is known as pacta sunt servanda,222 undergirds the voluntary and

consensual system of treaty-based relations between states. 223 Denunciation
or withdrawal clauses permit a state to end these relations through a lawful,
formal and public exit mechanism.224 If a state unilaterally invokes a
withdrawal clause, it is not breaching its commitments.225 Withdrawal in
accordance with the process provided under the treaty is lawful; however,
226
unjustified disobedience is not.

In this light, President Trump's announcement to withdraw the United
States from the Paris Agreement may be characterized as political theatre to
placate his electoral base and create political pressure for renegotiating
disfavored provisions.227 President Trump did not proclaim an immediately
effective renunciation of U.S. membership but declared that he would
withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement.228 According to the
process provided by the Paris Agreement, which was not put into question in
President Trump's announcement, a withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
could only be effective around the time of the next presidential election at
the earliest.229 Notably, President Trump decided not to exit the Paris
Agreement through a withdrawal of the United States from the UNFCCC,
which would take effect well within his first term. 230 This may be due to a
legal diagnosis that a presidential executive agreement, such as the Paris
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 1589.
225. See id. at 1613 29 (identifying and analyzing the distinct features of exit and breach).
226. See id. at 1581.
227. See id. at 1588.
228. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, supra note 109, at 2; see also
Nikki R. Haley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Diplomatic Note (Aug. 4, 2017)
("[T]he United States will submit to the Secretary- General, in accordance with Article 28,
paragraph 1 of the Agreement, formal written notification of withdrawal as soon as it is eligible
to do so."); see Karl Mathieson, Trump to submit notice of Pariswithdrawalto UN, CLIMATE HOME
NEWS (Apr. 8, 2017, 9:26 PM), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/08/04/tr-mpsubmit-notice-paris-withdrawal-un-reports/.
229. PA, supra note 5, arts.28.1, 28.2; Stephen P. Mulligan, Withdrawal from International
Agreements: Legal framework, The ParisAgreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement 19, FED'N OF
Am. SCIENTISTS (May 4, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44761.pdf. See also Deutscher
Bundestag, 'Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Rechtliche Modalititen und Folgen des Austritts der
USA aus dem Pariser Klimaschutz-Ubereinkommen vom 12. Dezember 2015, VD 3000
055/17 (2017) [hereinafter 'Wissenschaftliche Dienste], at 4, at https://www.bundestag.de/blob/
513892/fc32a476c5962458a4645a691244c/wd-2-055-17-pdf-data.pdf (explaining that: (1) for
the United States, which had deposited its instrument of acceptance on September 3, 2016, the
Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016; (2) the United States can therefore
withdraw on November 4, 2019, by submitting its notification of withdrawal to the United
Nations Secretary- General; and (3) the withdrawal will then be effective with the receipt of the
withdrawal notification and therefore, on November 5, 2010, at the earliest).
230. PA, supra note 5, art. 28.3. Mulligan, supra note 229, at 20. See also 'Wissenschaftliche
Dienste, supra note 229, at 4-5 (offering that: (1) a withdrawal from the UNFCCC would
automatically be a withdrawal from the Paris Agreement; (2) the UNFCCC entered into force
for the United States on March 21, 1994; and (3) therefore, a withdrawal would be possible at
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Agreement, is much easier to undo domestically than an Article II treaty,
such as the UNFCCC.231 This means that until its withdrawal takes effect in
late 2020, the United States remains a full member of the Paris Agreement
with all its obligations and margins of opportunity. Even after withdrawal,
the United States, unlike its several states, could rejoin the Paris Agreement
should domestic political realties change.232
Even when President Trump declared that the United States would cease
the implementation of its NDC and its contribution to the Green Climate
Fund, he did not technically disobey the Paris Agreement for three reasons.
The United States has already submitted its NDC.233 Moreover, the
substance of the NDCs is legally non-binding.34 Finally, the mobilization
of climate funds under the Paris Agreement has remained shrouded in legal
vagueness. 235 The fact that infra-national actors have already declared to
chip in is of great political symbolism in this regard.236
If President Trump goes ahead with the withdrawal of the United States
from the Paris Agreement in late 2019, this would not be the first time that a
party withdraws from a climate treaty. A domestic judicial challenge of a
withdrawal by the United States seems highly unlikely because U.S. law
offers even fewer anchoring arguments than those that were present in a
Canadian precedent involving an unsuccessful challenge by a member of
parliament of that government's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.37 In
its decision, the Canadian court first determined that the government's
discretion was not curtailed by domestic legislation, which incidentally was
repealed between the filing of the petition and the issuance of the court's
opinion.238 According to the court, the statute in question had urged the
government to operate under the Kyoto Protocol, and the government
any point in time and become effective with the expiry of one year from the submission of a
withdrawal notification).
231. Mulligan, supra note 229, at 8-15.
232. PA, supra note 5, art. 20. See 'Wissenschaftliche Dienste, supra note 229, at 5-6.
233. US Submits its Climate Action Plan Ahead of 2015 Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS
CLIMATE CHANcE (March 31, 2015), https://unfccc.int/index.php/news/united-states-submitsits -climate-action-plan -ahead-of-2015 -paris-agreement.
234. PA, supra note 5, arts. 4.2, 7.9.
235. See Bodansky, supra note 24, at 310 ("The United States and other developed countries
succeeded in excluding a reference to the Copenhagen one-hundred billion dollar per year
mobilization goal in the Paris Agreement itself. Instead, the only quantitative finance goal
appears in paragraph fifty-four of the Paris COP decision, which extends developed countries'
existing one-hundred-billion-dollar mobilization goal through 2025 and provides that the
parties shall set a new collective quantified goal prior to 2025 (not necessarily limited to
developed countries), using the one-hundred billion per year figure as a floor.").
236. Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, supra note 27, at 3 (observing that (1) in Paris the
developed countries pledged $19 billion to assist developing countries; and (2) due to broadened
donor base under the Paris Agreement, not only China and Vietnam, but also the cities of Paris
and Quebec made funding pledges).
237. Turp v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2012] 1 F.C. 893 (Can.).
238. Id.
18 26.
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complied by proceeding under that treaty's express withdrawal provision.239
Moreover, the court held that the democratic principle protecting the rights
of the legislature did not prohibit Canada's withdrawal.240 According to the
court, the House of Commons only ever passed a motion encouraging the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. This was a far cry from drawing a red
line that a withdrawal could cross. 241
E.

FIFTH MYTH

1. Assertion: The ParisAgreement Is Wbat the United States Says It Is
This myth invokes the special status of the United States as a superpower
and heavy weight in international relations, politics, and law.242 In addition
to being able to wield the dominance of the dollar, the United States is a
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.243 This
position allows the United States, acting alone, to block peace-coercion
law244 and enforcement of ICJ judgments.245
Obviously, the United States played a crucial role in all installments of the
international climate arc. Prior to subscribing to the Paris Agreement, the
United States had joined the UNFCCC, signed but not ratified the original
Kyoto Protocol, and supported the Copenhagen Accord.246 In the process
culminating in the Paris Agreement, the United States was successful in
ensuring that the language covering loss and damage in the Paris Agreement
steered clear of notions of liability and compensation under the law of state
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. 247 Similarly, the United
States successfully prevented the inclusion in the Paris Agreement of a dollar
amount for purposes of climate finance.248
2.

Rebuttal: The Rest of the World and the ParisAgreement

While the United States was a key actor in the Paris process, the Paris
Agreement is by no means a U.S. dictate. On the contrary, the Paris
Agreement equally reflects the inputs from others, especially the countries of
the Global South.249 They play a strong hand in international climate law
because a robust protection of the global atmosphere is simply elusive
without their buy-in.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. T 25.
Id. TT 29 32.
Id. T 31.
BEDERMAN, supra note 31, at 12.
UN Charter art. 23, T 1.
Id. arts. 24, 27, T 3, 39, 41 42.
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For example, when the United States pushed for replacing the harder
"shall," which had slipped into the text for the developed country NDCs,
with the softer "should" to harmonize the language of international
mitigation obligations for developed and developing countries alike, the
switch could not have been accomplished without the acceptance by the EU
and the G77.25 0 Similarly, the United States found allies in Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela, and China to stave off concrete long-term decarbonization
language.251
The give-and-take throughout the Paris process was in no small measure
owed to "indabas"-a consensus-building technique borrowed from the
Zulu and Xhosa peoples252 and "aimed at establishing a 'common mind' or
story that all participants can take with them."253 Indabas are successful
when "participants come with open minds motivated by the spirit of the
common good and listen to each other to find compromises that will benefit
the community as a whole."254
When President Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United
States from the Paris Agreement coupled with the perspective of a
renegotiation or the conclusion of a new treaty, other parties publicly closed
ranks in their strong support for the Paris Agreement and declared they were
not open to a new negotiation.255 Even if the United States were to scale
down or were to walk away from its already submitted NDC, this would
then be considered a violation of the spirit of the Paris Agreement, but
would not lead to its demise.
F.

SIXTH MYTH

1. Assertion: ParisAgreement Lawyers Are Not Real Lawyers
This myth levels the ultimate insult against legal professionals with
exposure to the climate arena. From the perspective of myth adherents, it
embodies the logical culmination of the previous five myths. If international
climate law is out there, if it has no practical relevance, if it is not law, if it
250. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors, 16
GLOBAL

ENVTL. POL. 1, 3 (2016), available at: http://politicalscience.uwo.ca/people/facultyl

full -time-faculty/GEP o20Paris%20Agreement.pdf.
251. See id. at 4; see also Ed King, Trillions Hang on Two Sentences as Paris Climate Talks Near
Climax, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/12/
08/trillions -hang-on-two-sentences -as -paris-climate-talks-near-climax/.
252. Ben Zimmer, The African Discussion Style 'Indaba' Thrived at Climate Talks, WALL STREET
J. (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-african-discussion-style-indaba-thrived-atclimate-talks- 1450456996.

253. Ask an Ethicist What can I do to address our changing planet in an ethical way?,
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254. Zimmer, supra note 252.
255. Johnathan Watts & Kate Connolly, World Leaders React after Trump Rejects Climate Deal,
GUARDIAN (June 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment2017/jun/Ol/
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subsists at the whim of its legal subjects, if it bows to the dictates of the
United States, then those who come into contact with it could be at most
dreamers in a spacey and fleeting world of ideas and ideals instead of real
lawyers.
2.

Rebuttal: Legal OpportunitiesAbound in the Orbit of the Paris
Agreement

Having debunked those other myths, I come to the opposite conclusion.
If international climate law is connected with the domestic realms, if it is
relevant, if it is real law, if it commands compliance, if all actors are equal
and autonomous, then real lawyers will be required for its creation,
interpretation, application, and enforcement.
Moreover, zooming out of the locution "Paris Agreement lawyers" reveals
the absurdity of the sixth myth. "International climate lawyer" may still
sound ephemeral. But "environmental lawyers," "energy lawyers," and "land
use lawyers" engage in relevant, recognized and robust practice areas.
Finally, because international climate law touches so many other disciplines,
it requires an even wider array of expertise and services. As we speak,
opportunities as well as challenges for international climate lawyers are
"growing by leaps-and-bounds."2s6

I1.

Final Thoughts

International climate law has not burst onto the scene in one big bang.
Rather, in consonance with the approach initiated by the UNFCCC,
international climate law has evolved over time. This evolution has seen
incremental progress and episodic setbacks.
The Paris Agreement offers a fresh start while considering prior
experiences in international climate law, policy, and politics. Borrowing
from the UNFCCC's successful COP template, it likewise creates a
command bridge in the conference of the parties serving as the meeting of
the parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA). In addition to reviewing the
overall performance of the Paris Agreement, the CMA will fine-tune the
details necessarily omitted from several shell provisions of the Paris
Agreement. Thus, the rulebooks for the implementation of the Paris
Agreement, including accounting rules and accountability procedures, will
be written under the auspices of the CMA. This effort will dominate the
international climate agenda for the next few years. 257
256. BEDERMAN, supra note 31, at 12.
257. For the decisions adopted at the Climate Change Conference in Katowice, Poland, see
Katowice Climate Change Conference (Dec. 2018), available at https://unfccc.int/katowice. See
also Proposal by the President Informal Compilation of L-Documents ("Paris Rulebook"),
available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Informal / 2OCompilation-proposal
20by%20the%20President-rev.pdf. For a concise summary, see Center for Climate and
Energy Solutions, Essential Elements of the Paris 'Rulebook' (Nov. 2018), available at https://
www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2018/11/essential -elements -paris-rulebook.pdf.
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In light of what our discussion of Professor Bederman's six myths has
revealed, the Paris Agreement may not be your typical multilateral
international law treaty. But it could very well be "a model for effective
global governance in the twenty-first century"258 in the way that it serves a
special constituency and a special value. The Paris Agreement serves all
inhabitants of the planet; and it equally fosters the rule of law in achieving
maximum protection of the global climate. It is thus the perfect illustration
of how untrue the myths are. As Professor Bederman so astutely and
graciously observes for all of us: "[P]racticing international law is not just
about a secure professional future. It is also about doing well by doing good
and being involved in a practice area that promotes the global rule of law,
peace, and justice."259 Sis felix!

258. Slaughter, supra note 216, at 1.
259. BEDERMAN, supra note 31, at 13.
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